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The Limits of Foreign Aid Diplomacy:








How does the institutional design of a state’s bureaucracy affect foreign policy? We argue that institutions can moderate
bureaucrats’ incentives to act in accordance with an Executive’s diplomatic preferences. Where the Executive can influ-
ence budgets or career paths, bureaucrats face incentives to adopt her diplomatic goals as their own. Where agencies are
shielded from Executive influence, bureaucrats are free to act independently in a bid to enhance their autonomy and
their reputation for competence. To test these expectations, we develop a new measure of bureaucratic independence
for the 15 aid-giving agencies in the US government. We analyze how independence affects foreign aid allocation pat-
terns over the 1999–2010 period. We find that in “dependent” agencies, foreign aid flows track the diplomatic objectives
of the president. In “independent” agencies, aid flows appear less responsive to presidential priorities and more respon-
sive to indicators of need in the recipient country. Our results highlight limits on the diplomatic use of foreign aid and
emphasize the importance of domestic institutional design. Our findings yield insight into a broad range of policy
domains—including international finance, immigration, and the application of economic sanctions—where multiple
government agencies are in charge of implementing foreign policy.
Presidents and prime ministers figure prominently in the
formulation of their nation’s foreign policy. Implement-
ing an Executive’s decisions, however, requires the coop-
eration of a much broader set of actors.1 For instance,
the military operations and subsequent reconstruction
efforts that George W. Bush initiated in Iraq drew contri-
butions from a diverse array of government agencies,
including five Cabinet-level Departments and an indepen-
dent agency.2 The same pattern arises in many other
issue areas, such as economic sanctions and immigration
policy, where a fragmented group of bureaucrats—who
may or may not share the Executive’s preferences—is in
charge of implementation.
In this article, we study patterns of foreign aid-giving to
assess how the institutional design of bureaucratic agen-
cies affects the realization of Executive preferences. Like
many scholars before us,3 we focus on the use of foreign
aid as a tool of diplomacy that advances a donor coun-
try’s economic and security self-interest. This “diplomatic”
view of aid-giving has received extensive empirical
support, but we argue that it rests on an incomplete
theoretical foundation.
Specifically, we take issue with the implicit—and erro-
neous—assumption that aid dollars are discretionary
funds that the Executive can freely deploy to target recip-
ients abroad.4 This premise is unrealistic. The executive
is not typically responsible for the implementation of aid
programs. Instead, she relies on agencies—such as the
United Kingdom’s Department for International Develop-
ment (DFID)—to disburse these funds. Furthermore, the
Executive who wants to guide foreign aid, or official
development assistance (ODA), allocation usually con-
tends with more than one aid-giving agency. Sweden, for
instance, used at least six different government agencies
to send ODA abroad in the last ten years; Germany used
no fewer than 17. In any given year, 15 different agencies
within the American government may disburse foreign
aid (Tierney, Nielson, Hawkins, Timmons Roberts,
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1 We use the term “Executive” to refer to a country’s primary leader. For
reasons of gender parity, we use feminine pronouns to refer to the Executive
throughout this paper.
2 The five Cabinet-level agencies are the Department of Commerce,
Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Department of State, and
Department of Treasury. The independent agency is the US Agency for Inter-
national Development.
3 See, for example, Alesina and Dollar (2000); Berthelemy and Tichit
(2004); Boone (1996); Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007); Bueno de
Mesquita and Smith (2009); Heinrich (2013); Kuziemko and Werker (2006);
Lancaster (2007); Maizels and Nissanke (1984); McKinlay and Little (1977);
Meernik, Krueger, and Poe (1998); Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor (1998).
4 Instead of developing leader-centric theories of aid allocation, much of
the empirical literature on ODA blackboxes the government. From that per-
spective, our argument offers a richer account of the domestic processes that
direct aid-giving.
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Findley, Powers, Parks, Wilson, and Hicks 2011). This
oversight matters, as it leads scholars to mischaracterize
the Executive’s ability to deploy ODA as a tool of diplo-
macy. It may also camouflage important patterns of aid-
giving at the subnational level and obscure the crucial
role of domestic institutions in foreign policy.
We examine how, in the American case, the institu-
tional design of the aid-giving bureaucracy affects the
Executive’s ability to assert control over ODA allocation.
We show that American agencies that distribute ODA vary
broadly in their degree of independence from the Execu-
tive. Their different levels of susceptibility to institutional-
ized political pressure, in turn, translate into markedly
different aid-giving patterns. Where bureaucrats are
“dependent” on the Executive, aid flows appear tightly
linked to the diplomatic objectives of the president, such
as strengthening military alliances and promoting bilat-
eral trade. Where bureaucrats enjoy an “independent”
position, however, ODA flows appear more responsive to
recipient need.
Our results highlight the role of domestic institutional
design as a limit on the diplomatic use of foreign aid.
Our findings also have implications across a broad range
of foreign policy domains where multiple government
agencies control implementation. In terms of transgov-
ernmental politics, for instance, independent agencies
that can resist executive pressure may take a stance on
foreign policy issues that diverges from the preferences
of the Executive. This may result in foreign governments
receiving mixed messages when they interact with inde-
pendent bureaucratic agencies. And, in some cases, it can
lead to a loss of foreign policy coherence.
In the next section, we situate our work in the broader
International Relations literature. We point out that most
prior research on aid-giving focuses on political institu-
tions on the recipient side; it ignores the problems that
executives face when they try to assert control over their
own bureaucracies. Our paper challenges these
approaches by demonstrating how institutional character-
istics on the donor side affect who gives foreign aid to
whom and why. We then draw on work from the field of
American politics to define the concept of agency inde-
pendence, and introduce a novel measure of indepen-
dence for US aid-giving agencies. We conclude with the
results of a regression analysis that supports our claim for
a moderating effect of agency independence on the rela-
tionship between, on the one hand, diplomatic and devel-
opment motives and, on the other, ODA flows.
Foreign Aid as a Tool of Diplomacy
Research on the determinants of foreign aid-giving sug-
gests that donors focus on diplomatic rather than develop-
ment considerations when they choose where to disburse
aid.5 McKinlay and Little (1977) propose one of the first
modern empirical tests of this proposition. They find little
evidence that levels of foreign aid correlate with the social
and economic needs of recipient countries. In contrast,
they find strong support for the idea that the diplomatic
interests—such as economic and security concerns—
of donor countries influence aid disbursal decisions.
This finding is robust to a number of proxy measures for
security and economic incentives, including bilateral
trade (Meernik et al. 1998; Schraeder et al. 1998;
Berthelemy and Tichit 2004; Bueno de Mesquita and
Smith 2007, 2009), foreign direct investment (Alesina
and Dollar 2000; Berthelemy and Tichit 2004), security
alliances (Meernik et al. 1998; Schraeder et al. 1998; Bue-
no de Mesquita and Smith 2007, 2009), US troops sta-
tioned in the recipient country (Meernik et al. 1998),
UN votes and Security Council seats (Alesina and Dollar
2000; Kuziemko and Werker 2006), and geographic dis-
tance (Neumayer 2005; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith
2007, 2009; Fink and Redaelli 2011; Raschky and Sch-
windt 2012; Dietrich 2013; Heinrich 2013). Moreover,
diplomatic considerations prove influential even when we
might expect development concerns to trump them. For
instance, Fink and Redaelli (2011) and Raschky and Sch-
windt (2012) find that economic and security motives
guide postdisaster relief aid distribution.
Numerous works articulate the theoretical underpin-
nings for these findings (for example, Maizels and Nis-
sanke 1984; Boone 1996; Schraeder et al. 1998; Alesina
and Dollar 2000; Berthelemy 2006; Bueno de Mesquita
and Smith 2007; Bearce and Tirone 2010; Heinrich
2013). Most directly, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith
(2009) explain how government leaders’ desire to stay in
office leads them to offer foreign aid in exchange for pol-
icy concessions by recipients. This argument rests on the
implicit assumption, shared by much of this literature,
that flows of development assistance move unproblemati-
cally from the Executive in the donor country to the reci-
pient country.
Of course, some may dismiss this assumption as an
innocuous empirical convenience since, until recently,
aid data remained unavailable at the subnational level.
Yet, we argue that this assumption can lead to a skewed
interpretation of Executive authority with respect to
ODA. Indeed, scholars who study aggregated aid flows
may overstate the Executive’s ability to direct ODA from
independent agencies, but understate the extent of her
control over dependent agencies. In that sense, leader-
centric theories and “black box” empirical approaches
risk masking a great deal of heterogeneity in ODA flows,
and may fail to capture the micro-level mechanisms that
direct aid flows.
Our approach complements recent work that shows a
more nuanced understanding of disaggregated foreign
aid flows. For example, we now know that donors choose
strategically between various forms of aid, such as grants,
food, or emergency relief (Fariss 2010; Raschky and
Schwindt 2012). Donors also provide aid through multi-
ple channels, including bilateral, multilateral, or non-gov-
ernmental organizations (Maizels and Nissanke 1984;
Winters 2010; Dietrich 2013). Furthermore, domestic
political institutions on the recipient side can condition
how much aid is received, and what effects it has on local
populations (Svensson 1999; Burnside and Dollar 2000;
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009; Lebovic and Voeten
2009; Dietrich 2013).
We make a novel contribution to this scholarly discus-
sion by drawing attention to a crucial, but oft-ignored,
determinant of aid allocation patterns: the structure of
the aid-giving bureaucracy on the donor country side.6
5 We follow Lancaster (2007:ix) by referring to goals associated with
“advancing the national security and economic interests of the donor country”
as “diplomacy,” and by referring to efforts to “help better the human condi-
tion in countries receiving the aid” as “development.”
6 It is important to note the distinction between our approach, which
emphasizes the choice of recipients, and the important strand of literature which
links domestic political institutions to aid-giving levels. See Noel and Therien
(1995) and Therien and Noel (2000).
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Specifically, we point to how the institutional design of aid-
giving agencies affects who receives aid and, critically, how
much say the Executive has in such decisions. In the next
section, we explore a key agency design feature—whether
the agency is “independent” from the Executive—in the
context of American aid allocation decisions.
Agency Independence and Foreign Policy Preferences
Our core argument is that an agency’s structural design
can moderate bureaucrats’ incentives to allocate aid dol-
lars in accordance with Executive preferences. In the Uni-
ted States, some “dependent” agencies are institutionally
tied to the president, and this allows her to punish or
reward the decisions of bureaucrats who work within
those agencies. Other agencies, in contrast, enjoy struc-
tural insulation from presidential influence; bureaucrats
who work in these “independent” agencies often feel less
pressure to support the president’s foreign policy agenda.
In this section, we leverage the concept of agency inde-
pendence to develop expectations about aid-disburse-
ment patterns. First, we draw on the bureaucratic
independence literature to identify a set of formal institu-
tional features that can insulate agencies from influence
by the Executive. Then, we argue that the Executive’s
preferences over foreign policy lead her to favor the allo-
cation of ODA to countries that help advance her military
and economic agenda. Finally, we point out that a differ-
ent set of concerns—including public service, budget
maximization, and career advancement—motivates
bureaucrats and that those goals should have an indirect
influence on the choice of aid recipients. Where the
Executive can influence budgets or career paths, bureau-
crats face incentives to adopt the president’s diplomatic
goals as their own. Where agencies are protected from
Executive influence, the public service orientation of
bureaucrats may lead them to direct aid where it is most
needed.
Agency Independence
“Agency independence” is a core concept in the study of
the American bureaucracy.7 Scholars have proposed
numerous definitions, but the unifying theme is a focus
on the extent of influence that the president can wield
over bureaucrats (for example, Devins and Lewis 2008).
As Justice Scalia puts it, “independent agencies are shel-
tered not from politics but from the President” (Barkow
2010:26).8
In practice, the degree of independence that an agency
enjoys depends on institutional factors, such as its organi-
zational “proximity” to the president. For example, the
Office of Science and Technology, which is part of the
Executive Office of the President, is often considered less
independent than the Department of Labor, an agency
within the president’s Cabinet. Both agencies, however,
are closer to the presidential orbit than the US Trade
and Development Agency (TDA), which is separate from
the Executive branch and whose leaders do not report
directly to the president. This distinction is reflected in
Table 1, where we list all 15 aid-giving agencies along
with a basic classification as “Executive” or “Indepen-
dent.”
While this simple classification scheme helps introduce
the idea of independence, the concept is decidedly more
nuanced. In addition to basic proximity to the president,
other institutional safeguards can serve to shield an
agency from the Executive. Because appointments and
firings are a primary source of presidential power (Selin
forthcoming), personnel protections are commonly used
to mitigate the Executive’s influence. An expertise
requirement, for example, minimizes the risk that the
president will appoint an incompetent but politically con-
nected agency head. Likewise, fixed terms in office may
reduce the likelihood of politically motivated firings.
Such safeguards can take a variety of forms, but they are
designed to bolster the independence of an agency so
that it is free to pursue its organizational goals.
Design choices are made at the time of an agency’s cre-
ation (Lewis 2003:21–38), and legislators clearly antici-
pate the effects of these choices on agency decision
making. For example, the Millennium Challenge Corpo-
ration (MCC) was established as an independent agency
in large part because of concerns that its development
focus would be compromised if it were housed within an
executive branch agency (Lancaster 2007:106–7). Accord-
ing to the Congressional Research Service, a “reason for
not placing the [Millennium Challenge Account (MCA)]9
within the State Department may have been a concern
that it would be located too close to the center of the US
foreign policy apparatus that would limit the program’s
immunity from strategic and political influences” (Nowels
2003:20). Echoing this sentiment, then-Senator Joseph
Biden argued against placing MCA under the control of
the State Department due, in part, to his opposition to
recent decisions by Republicans to move other indepen-
dent agencies into State, thus “making the [S]ecretary (of
State) the captain of foreign policy” (Sorrells 2003). By
giving the MCA to a newly created independent agency,
legislators understood that presidents would have less
influence on spending decisions.
Over time, agency design choices are maintained
through a variety of political oversight mechanisms, such
as investigations, personnel decisions, and budget alloca-
tions.10 While Congress and the president jointly perform
7 The idea of creating institutional safeguards to isolate bureaucrats from
political influence is neither new nor unique to the study of American poli-
tics, however. For instance, in the field of political economy, scholars argue
that delegating monetary authority to an independent central bank can
reduce inflation and is associated with a variety of desirable macroeconomic
outcomes. See Alesina and Summers (1993); Barro and Gordon (1983);
Cukierman (1992); De Long and Summers (1992); Lohmann (1992); Rogoff
(1985). In this context, “independence“ is understood to mean “how far the
bank could stray from the current government’s desires before the latter
would prefer to pay the costs of altering the bank law or of seizing the
monetary reins itself” (Franzese 1999:682).
8 Whether institutional safeguards translate into effective independence in
practice remains an open (empirical) question. On the one hand, scholars
find evidence that design can be effective at buffering the president
(Hammond and Knott 1996; Lewis 2003; Wood and Bohte 2004; Devins and
Lewis 2008; Selin forthcoming). On the other, Bressman and Thompson
(2010:601) note that “even if an independent agency is not under the thumb
of the President, it might still feel the hand of the President.”
9 The MCA is the aid program that came to be administered by the Mil-
lennium Challenge Corporation (MCC).
10 For instance, an agency’s budget can limit that agency’s level of inde-
pendence by including stipulations on how agency funds may or may not be
spent. Conversely, the absence of such stipulations may enhance an agency’s
autonomy. Generally, agency budgets are the result of negotiations between
the president and Congress as part of the annual appropriations process; to
have an agency budget, both chambers of Congress must pass an appropria-
tions bill, which the president must sign. For most dependent agencies, the
president has first and last mover advantage, since she vets agency budgets at
the proposal stage and signs (or vetoes) appropriations bills at the final stage.
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oversight of agencies, in the context of our argument
about ODA, we focus on the influence of the president
for two reasons.
First, when it comes to questions of foreign policy, the
president remains paramount. As Wildavsky (1966:7)
famously asserted, “in the realm of foreign policy, there
has not been a single major issue on which presidents,
when they were serious and determined, have failed.”
Canes-Wrone, Howell, and Lewis (2008:5) build on this
“two presidencies” thesis, arguing that presidents have
informational and first-mover advantages over Congress,
and that “distinctive electoral incentives across the two
branches of government encourage greater presidential
influence over foreign than domestic policy.” The authors
conclude that, between 1969 and 2000, the president’s
supremacy in foreign policy led Congress to delegate
much of its decision-making power to the Executive. So
when agencies seek out political leadership on foreign
policy issues, it is natural that they turn to the White
House rather than to Capitol Hill.
Second, congressional preferences over foreign policy
and foreign aid are less predictable and coherent than
those of the president. Even if an aid-giving agency
wanted to be responsive to Congress, it is not clear ex-ante
which congressional actors would matter at that time and
for that issue. In the 111th Congress (2009–2010), for
example, 18 committees and 44 subcommittees held
hearings related to international affairs or foreign aid.11
Furthermore, even if the set of relevant actors was clear,
an agency may still not be able to anticipate the prefer-
ences of those actors, since there is no clear partisan
divide with respect to ODA allocation. Rather, Milner
and Tingley (2010) find that congressional support for
aid varies based on the type of aid in question and
on the characteristics of a legislator’s district. And even
individual legislators can send mixed messages about
their preferences over foreign aid allocation.12 Thus, to
the extent that agency bureaucrats attempt to match
ODA flows to the preferences of political actors, we
expect to see a bias toward the president, a unitary actor
with a more coherent set of preferences.
Executive Preferences
Foreign policy is a central component of any presi-
dent’s agenda (Wildavsky 1966; Moe and Howell 1999;
Canes-Wrone 2005; Canes-Wrone et al. 2008), and
foreign aid presents an opportunity to further her dip-
lomatic goals. As such, it is reasonable to expect that
the president will prefer to distribute foreign aid in
ways that advance traditional notions of the national
interest, particularly military and economic security
(Krasner 1978; Hibbs 2000; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier
2000).
The electoral connection closely ties the president to
the national interest. While perhaps not quite “single-
minded” in the Mayhewian sense, reelection concerns—or
party and legacy concerns for term-limited presidents—
figure prominently in the literature on the American
presidency (Neustadt 1962; Tulis 1987). Currying favor
with voters means tending myopically to the nation’s eco-
nomic and military interests. While American citizens are
notoriously detached from foreign policy (Delli Carpini
and Keeter 1993; Holsti 2004), when they do engage, it is
nearly always in matters of pressing security (Powlick and
Katz 1998) or economic (Mansfield, Milner, and Rosen-
dorff 2002) importance. As a result, questions of foreign
aid—like most nuts and bolts issues of foreign policy—
tend to operate well beneath the public’s radar (Page
TABLE 1. Foreign Aid Agencies in the United States
Agency name Abbr. Binary independence classification
Department of Agriculture USDA Executive
Department of Defense DOD Executive
Department of Energy DOE Executive
Department of Health and Human Services HHS Executive
Department of the Interior DOI Executive
Department of Labor DOL Executive
Department of State STATE Executive
Department of the Treasury TREAS Executive
Export-Import Bank of the United States EXIM Independent
Millennium Challenge Corporation MCC Independent
Office of Science and Technology OST Executive
US Agency for International Development* AID Independent
US African Development Foundation ADF Independent
US Institute of Peace USIP Independent
US Trade and Development Agency TDA Independent
(Note. *USAID constitutes a significant portion of US ODA (66% in 2010). However, the amounts given by the other agencies are still very large and substantively
important, see Figures S1 and S2. For example, the MCC, which committed five percent of the US foreign aid budget in 2010, gave more than the ODA disburse-
ments from each of 15 OECD countries: South Korea, Turkey, Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Luxembourg, Poland, New Zealand, Czech Republic, Israel, Hungary,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Iceland, and Estonia (Provost 2011).)
11 Committee data from the Policy Agendas Project, http://www.policyag-
endas.org/. To determine the number of unique committees and subcommit-
tees, we subsetted the data to the Congress in question and identified
hearings on major topic “19” (International Affairs and Foreign Aid). While
this includes some hearings that are not specifically about ODA, international
affairs hearings may touch on country-specific issues that bear indirectly on
ODA decisions.
12 For instance, while arguing against cuts to the budget, Senator Patrick
Leahy (D-VT) lauds both diplomatic and development priorities by stating that
foreign aid “promotes US exports, supports democratic elections, combats
poverty, and helps build alliances to counter terrorism, thwart drug traffick-
ing, protect the environment, and stop cross-border crime” (Leahy 2011).
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and Shapiro 1983; Ostrom and Simon 1985). The impli-
cation is that presidents prefer to allocate aid to those
countries that bolster military and economic interests.13
Bureaucrats’ Incentives
Students of bureaucratic politics and public administra-
tion identify a host of motivations for bureaucrats (see
Golden 2000). We explore how three central motives
from this literature—agency reputation, budget maximi-
zation, and career advancement—indirectly translate into
preferences over foreign aid disbursement. As we explain
below, agency structure can enable the Executive to
manipulate bureaucrats’ incentives in order to target aid
in ways that support the president’s diplomatic agenda.
To begin, a sense of professionalism or duty to public
service often motivates bureaucrats (Derthick and Quirk
1985; Wilson 1989; Brehm and Gates 1993; Dilulio 1994;
Golden 2000). While this may initially seem altruistic, it
can also serve bureaucrats’ self-interest. By enhancing
their reputation for competence and efficacy, bureaucrats
can build autonomy for their organization (Carpenter
2001:3–11). Carpenter (2010:56) explains that “pay, bud-
get maximization, and material goods will be valued less
highly than status and esteem” and that reputation serves
as a proximate goal to many different ends. In the con-
text of ODA, the surest way for bureaucrats to signal pro-
fessionalism, impartiality, and public spiritedness is to
select recipients based on “objective” need-based indica-
tors.14 This suggests that bureaucrats’ efforts to secure
autonomy should lead them to prefer giving to countries
where development needs are greatest. Where the Execu-
tive cannot frustrate these efforts (i.e., in independent
agencies), the link between recipient need and ODA
receipts should be stronger.
Niskanen (1971) points to another motive when he
argues that bureaucrats seek to maximize agency budgets.
This theory leads us to expect that dependent agencies
will exhibit a bias toward presidential priorities. To see
why, consider that most dependent agencies submit draft
budget proposals to the president’s Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB). OMB acts as a gatekeeper—
reviewing each agency’s proposal alongside those of other
agencies, and making cuts to programs in order to
adhere to a top line figure—before submitting the entire
budget to Congress for approval. This budgetary over-
sight may enable the Executive to influence policymaking
at the agency level. Independent agencies, in contrast, do
not engage in the same negotiations with OMB. Instead,
they submit their own budget request directly to Congress
or they may have their own funding streams, which are
not subject to the annual appropriations process. For
instance, the U.S. Institute of Peace—an independent
aid-giving agency—enjoys a “budget bypass,” meaning
that it is not required to have its budget approved by
OMB prior to submitting it to Congress. This suggests
that independent agencies should be less beholden to
presidential priorities, even if they are budget-focused.
Finally, some scholars argue that agency bureaucrats
seek to enhance their own career prospects (Kaufman
1960; Golden 2000:20–25; Gailmard and Patty 2007). In
dependent agencies, many of the leaders serve “at the
pleasure of the president.” These political appointees
usually share the same party affiliation as the president,
and tend to be selected for their fealty to her policy
program. As a result, career-focused bureaucrats are
likely to steer policy toward presidential priorities, in
an attempt to curry favor with the Executive. Doing so
can help them secure future promotions and enhance
their standing in the party. Independent agencies, on
the other hand, have fewer presidential appointees.
They also tend to have staggered board or commission
leadership structures. This weakens the ties between the
current presidential administration and the career path
of individual bureaucrats.
Taken together, existing theories of bureaucratic moti-
vation suggest that the institutional design of an agency
may serve to temper or exacerbate incentives to succumb
to political pressure by the Executive. Efforts to gain
autonomy reinforce bureaucrats’ public service orienta-
tion and encourage need-based giving. In independent
agencies, this tendency is unimpinged. In dependent
agencies, however, the personal and organizational pay-
offs for diplomacy-enhancing ODA may be higher,
because the president can bestow greater rewards and
impose dearer costs. We therefore expect dependent
agencies to disburse foreign aid in ways that are consis-
tent with the administration’s broader diplomatic goals of
military and economic security. In contrast, we expect the
tendency of aid bureaucrats to allocate funds based on
development need to be strengthened in independent
agencies.
To be clear, we do not expect that dependent agen-
cies will only allocate funds to meet diplomatic objec-
tives, nor do we suggest that independent agencies will
only focus on recipients’ development needs. Agencies
serve a variety of functions, only some of which can be
characterized as development-related, and they do so
using a portfolio of policy instruments.15 Rather, we
propose that when it comes to selecting foreign aid
recipients, agency independence affects the relative
weight that bureaucrats place on diplomatic and devel-
opment concerns.
Measuring Agency Independence
To test these propositions, we build an index measure of
independence for 89 US government agencies, including
the 15 that disburse foreign aid. This index leverages data
from the Sourcebook of United States Executive Agencies (Lewis
and Selin 2012), and aggregates information on nine
institutional characteristics, which help insulate agencies
from elected political leaders’ influence. For example, we
13 We do not argue that the Executive only cares about diplomatic goals.
Indeed, Heinrich (2013) identifies conditions under which the Executive may
prioritize development goals. Nevertheless, we expect that an electorate that
primarily focuses on economic and security concerns will lead the Executive
to emphasize diplomatic goals when distributing foreign aid.
14 In recent years, several critics have decried the lack of transparent and
systematic measures of aid effectiveness (Lawson 2013; International Aid
Transparency Initiative 2014). In the absence of agreed-upon competence
metrics, the degree to which an aid-giving agency is attuned to recipient need
often serves as a proxy for bureaucrats’ type for the public, the media, and
other stakeholders.
15 For example, the budget of the Department of State—an agency that is
in the president’s Cabinet and which we categorize as highly dependent—
includes a variety of activities that are oriented toward presidential priorities
like “investments in the stability, security, and development of Afghanistan
and Pakistan.” However, the budget also includes activities that appear more
development-oriented, such as a “comprehensive and integrated global health
strategy toward achieving an AIDS-free generation and ending preventable
child and maternal deaths” (Department of State 2014). We acknowledge that
the patterns we propose here are not absolutes and that public relations and
legal requirements may cause deviations from these broader trends.
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consider whether or not an agency is part of the Execu-
tive branch, if the agency head can be removed without
cause or between regular/fixed terms in office, and the
number of positions that are subject to presidential
appointment (see Table 2 for a full list).
Our objective was to produce an index that effec-
tively summarizes those institutional features, while also
reducing the dimensionality of the problem at hand.
We also want to avoid procedures that assign a priori
weights to each of the variables—such as simple averag-
ing—because we cannot know exactly how each of
them contributes to independence. Principal compo-
nents analysis (PCA) is a natural way to achieve these
goals.16 This technique allows us to derive “optimal”
weights from the data, and it produces scores which
can be used to summarize the variance found in the
institutional characteristics data set.17 We thus normal-
ize the nine variables to have mean zero and a stan-
dard deviation of one, and use them to estimate a PCA
model. We rescale the first principal component to
ensure that all aid-giving agencies score between zero
(dependent) and one (independent), and use the
resulting variable as our measure of agency indepen-
dence in subsequent regression analyses.
Table 2 allows us to assess the validity of our mea-
surement model; it states our expectations and reports
the estimated loadings/weights for each of the variables
that we include in the PCA model. A plus sign in the
second column indicates that the variable should be
positively related to an agency’s degree of indepen-
dence. For example, fixed terms in office for the
agency head should increase her degree of independence,
so we expect the “Fixed terms” loading to be positive.
All the PCA loadings fall in line with our theoretical
expectations.
Another way to assess the plausibility of our mea-
surement model is to see how agencies rank on the
independence index itself. Table A1 in the appendix
shows PCA scores for all 89 agencies, including the 15
aid-giving agencies that we consider in the regression
models. We see, for example, that departments rank low
on independence, whereas more technical and tradition-
ally independent agencies such as the Federal Reserve
Board and the Postal Regulatory Commission rank very
highly. There is also variation in the degree of indepen-
dence across aid-giving agencies, with the Department of
State at the low end, USAID near the mid-point of the
distribution, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation
near the top. This ordering conforms to our qualitative
assessment of these agencies.
Finally, we note that much of the variation we see in
the index would be obscured if we used the more tradi-
tional binary measure of agency independence. To see
this, consider Figure 1 where we plot our independence
measure against a dummy coded as 0 if the agency is an
executive department or in the Executive Office of the
President and 1 otherwise (Lewis and Selin 2012).18
Thus, we use our theoretically-motivated and more
nuanced measure of agency independence in the regres-
sion analyses that follow.
Agency Independence and Foreign Aid:
A Regression Analysis
The ideas introduced above lead us to expect that, if
institutional design is effective, the relationship between
diplomatic motives and aid allocation will be weaker
where agencies are relatively independent from the Exec-
utive. In contrast, the positive association between devel-
opment motives and ODA should be stronger in
independent agencies.
We operationalize the concept of “diplomatic” aid-
giving with two commonly used variables: alliance and
trade. Alliance is a dummy variable that takes on a value
TABLE 2. Agency Independence: 1st Principal Component Loadings
Variable Expectation Loadings Description
Fixed terms + 0.467 1 if members, commissioners, or agency heads are appointed for fixed terms. 0 otherwise.
Independent + 0.417 1 if the agency is outside the Executive Office of the President or is not an executive department.
0 otherwise.
For cause + 0.348 1 if restrictions are in place for dismissal of the agency head. 0 otherwise.
Expertise + 0.335 1 if expertise or experience requirement on nominations at the agency. 0 otherwise.
Commission + 0.33 1 if agency is governed by a board or commission whose members are protected from removal.
0 otherwise.
Serve President  0.072 1 if officials serve at the pleasure of the President. 0 otherwise.
PA  0.074 Log number of presidential appointees.
PAS  0.264 Log number of presidential appointees with Senate confirmation.
Schedule C  0.431 Log number of Schedule C excepted appointments.
(Note. Variable descriptions adapted from Lewis and Selin (2012).)
16 PCA enables us to summarize the variation in the nine institutional
features, reducing it to a low-dimensional index that can effectively act as a
measure of agency independence. An alternative approach is to model agency
independence as a latent concept, as Selin (forthcoming) does also using the
Sourcebook of United States Executive Agencies data. Her approach further differs
from ours in that she measures agency independence on a two-dimensional
space, whereas we consider a single dimension. In practice, PCA and factor
analysis are often used interchangeably. In Table S11 of the appendix, we
show that replacing our measure with Selin’s (institutional) measure of agency
independence does not substantively affect our conclusions.
17 While we believe that the “agnostic” PCA approach is ultimately appro-
priate in the context of this paper, this approach forces us to ignore relevant
prior information about the relative importance of individual components. In
particular, the question of whether an agency is part of the Executive Office
of the President should be a major consideration in our assessment (this
dummy variable is often used on its own to measure agency independence in
the bureaucracy literature). In Table S10 (online appendix), we replicate our
analysis using this binary indicator as a measure of independence.
18 In Table S10 of the online appendix, we replicate our primary regres-
sion results using a commonly used binary measure of independence. The
results support those presented here, but readers will note that the marginal
effects we estimate using the binary measure are substantially smaller than the
marginal effects we estimate using our continuous index of independence.
This finding is consistent with the idea that the binary variable measures inde-
pendence with error, thereby introducing attenuation bias in the estimation.
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of 1 if the US and the partner country have at least one
of four types of alliances: defense, neutrality, nonaggres-
sion, or entente (Gibler 2013). Here, foreign aid could
play the role of side-payment—that is, a reward for the
past decision to conclude an alliance—or it could simply
be construed as a “maintenance cost” that the US pays to
remain influential in a theater that holds strategic impor-
tance. Our Alliance variable is a useful way to delineate
the group of countries where the United States is likely
to incur those kinds of costs.
The second measure of diplomatic motive, Trade, is
the log of bilateral trade flows between the recipient
and the United States (Barbieri and Keshk 2012). Rela-
tionships with major trade partners are particularly
important to the president, since those countries can
develop influential support coalitions within the Ameri-
can public and business community. To satisfy these
domestic groups, the president has incentives to culti-
vate support abroad in order to ensure that the policies
that led to fruitful economic cooperation are not over-
turned.
Because Alliance and Trade are imperfect proxies for
diplomatic interest, the online appendix reports the
results of regression models using four alternate mea-
sures: the logged number of US troops stationed in the
recipient country (Kane 2006), the geographic distance
from the United States (Mayer and Zignago 2006), the
log of outward FDI flows from the United States to the
recipient (OECD 2014a), and a dummy for the exis-
tence of a bilateral tax treaty between the United States
and the recipient (Internal Revenue Service 2014).19,20
To measure “development” aid-giving, we use the log
of the Infant Mortality rate as an indicator of need in reci-
pient countries (World Bank 2013). Again, to demon-
strate the robustness of our results to the choice of
measure, we replicate the analysis using four alternate
representations of need in the recipient country: the log
of GDP per capita, share of the population living with
HIV/AIDS, life expectancy, and proportion of the popu-
lation living on less than $5 per day.21
The dependent variable in our tests is the annual
ODA commitments from US government agencies, and
covers the 1999–2010 period.22 Unless otherwise noted,
our unit of observation is the agency-country-year. To
estimate the moderating influence of agency indepen-
dence on the relationship between policy motives and
aid allocation, we use an interactive linear model of
this form:
ODA ¼ bodaODAt1 þ bindIndependence
þ bmotMotiveþ bindmotInd:Motiveþ bgdpGDP
þ bpopPopulationþ bdemDemocracy þ Xþ aþ e;
ð1Þ
where “ODA” represents the log dollar amount of ODA
that a recipient country gets; “Independence” is the
measure of agency independence described above;
“Motive” is one of three proxy measures of foreign pol-
icy motives (military alliances, trade flows, and infant
mortality); Ω is a vector of year, country, and/or
agency fixed effects, or a set of agency-specific time
trends; a is a constant; and e is the disturbance term.
For obvious reasons, we also control for log GDP per
capita, log population size (World Bank 2013), and the
regime type of the recipient country (Marshall, Jaggers,
and Gurr 2012). Where no other indication is given,
models are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares,
and the reported standard errors are robust to arbitrary
forms of heteroskedasticity.
Results
Table 3 presents results for the models described by
equation 1. The coefficient estimates are consistent with
our expectations. Military alliances are positively related
to ODA flows from agencies that are not shielded from
influence by the Executive (ball = 0.599, with p < 0.01),
but this relationship nearly disappears in highly
independent agencies (ball + bind*all = 0.025). Similar















FIG 1. Continuous vs. Binary Measures of Agency Independence From the Executive. 89 US Government Agencies with Four Aid-Giving
Agencies Identified by Name
19 All diplomacy results are consistent with our expectations, except in the
distance model, where we find a negative relationship between distance and
ODA flows, but no conditioning effect by the agency independence variable.
See Table S13 in the online appendix.
20 For prior work on the relationship between aid and alliances, see Meer-
nik et al. 1998; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007, 2009; Schraeder et al.
1998. On trade flows, see Berthelemy and Tichit 2004; Meernik et al. 1998;
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007, 2009; Schraeder et al. 1998. On military
troops, see Meernik et al. 1998. On distance, see Dietrich 2013; Fink and Re-
daelli 2011; Heinrich 2013; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007, 2009; Ne-
umayer 2005; Raschky and Schwindt 2012. On FDI, see Alesina and Dollar
2000; Berthelemy and Tichit 2004.
21 See Table S12 in the online appendix. Results are consistent across all
development models, except when we consider the $5 per day variable, in
which case the interaction term is of the expected sign but is not statistically
significant.
22 The original data points were recorded at the project level by AidData
(Tierney et al. 2011), but we aggregate them to obtain agency-level figures.
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btra = 0.264 (p < 0.01) and btra + bind*tra = 0.023. All aid
agencies appear to respond positively to infant mortality,
our indicator of recipient need (binf = 0.230, with
p < 0.01). This tendency appears to be reinforced where
agencies are independent from influence by the Executive
(binf + bind*inf = 0.478). All three interaction term coeffi-
cients cross usual thresholds of statistical significance.
A more accessible way to convey the same basic
results is to look at a graphical representation. Figure 2
plots the marginal effects of our three policy motives
from Table 3. In the Alliance and Trade cases, the mar-
ginal effects of diplomacy motives on ODA in dependent
agencies are positive and statistically significant at the
a = 0.05 level. In the Infant Mortality case, the mar-
ginal effect slopes up as agency independence increases
(moving right along the x-axis). In concrete terms, this
means that agency independence weakens the positive
association between ODA flows and both military alli-
ances and trade relationships. In contrast, agency inde-
pendence reinforces the positive association between
ODA flows and infant mortality.
Given the semi-log specification of the Alliance test, it
is easy to get a sense of the substantive importance of
the estimated effect sizes.23 On average, and holding
other regressors constant, US allies tend to receive
nearly 60% more ODA than nonallies where the agency
lacks institutional safeguards against Executive influ-
ence. This marginal effect becomes indistinguishable
from zero as soon as the degree of agency indepen-
dence reaches about 0.7 on the 0–1 scale. Similarly, a
change of one standard deviation in the (logged) trade
variable is associated with an increase of about 65%
(2.47 9 0.264) in ODA from dependent agencies.
Again, this positive relationship vanishes as we increase
the degree of independence. Finally, moving from zero
to one on the Independence scale is associated with an
increase of about 25% in the estimated marginal effect
of Log (Infant Mortality).
In sum, the results described in Table 3 and Figure 2
are consistent with our theoretical expectations, and the
sizes of the estimated marginal effects are large and sub-
stantively significant.
Robustness
These results are robust to a series of alternative model
specifications. We consider the two most important ones
here, and list additional robustness checks in Footnote
24, with full results recorded in the supplementary mate-
rials that accompany this article.24
The first issue we investigate relates to the panel specifi-
cation of our tests, and to the fact that most of the varia-
tion in the data set is cross-sectional. Indeed, it is true that
Independence is a constant for each agency and that the
motive measures—Alliance, Trade, and Infant Mortality—
tend to be slow moving. Still, given that there is variation
over time in the policy motives variables, and considering
that stickiness in the two sets of variables is “cross-cutting”
(i.e., within agency vs. within country), it is reasonable to
use all dimensions of the data to estimate the interaction
terms that interest us. Nevertheless, our main findings do
not hang on the panel structure of the data set. The first
three models of Table 4 show linear model estimates
obtained from a pure cross section, using only the mean
of each variable at the agency-country level. Ignoring
TABLE 3. Relationship Between Foreign Policy Motives, Agency Independence, and ODA Allocation Patterns. Linear Models. Robust Standard
Errors. The Models Include Agency and Year Fixed Effects, as well as Agency-Specific Time Trends (Omitted From the Table)
Log (ODA) 1 Log (ODA) 2 Log (ODA) 3
(Intercept) 0.368 (0.360) 3.286 (0.530) 3.669 (0.543)
Log (ODA)t1 0.672 (0.008) 0.676 (0.008) 0.676 (0.007)
Polity 0.019 (0.004) 0.027 (0.004) 0.035 (0.004)
Log (GDP/Cap) 0.373 (0.021) 0.518 (0.032) 0.150 (0.032)
Log (Population) 0.142 (0.018) 0.000 (0.028) 0.197 (0.017)
Alliance 0.599 (0.105)
Alliance 9 Independence 0.574 (0.197)
Log (Trade) 0.264 (0.025)
Log (Trade) 9 Independence 0.241 (0.035)
Log (Infant Mortality) 0.230 (0.060)
Log (Infant Mortality) 9 Independence 0.248 (0.087)
R2 0.671 0.665 0.667
Num. obs. 20,037 20,468 22,666
23 But see Thornton and Innes (1989) for a discussion of potential prob-
lems related to the interpretation of semi-log coefficients as percentage
change in the dependent variable.
24 We re-estimated the base models from Table 3 using various combina-
tions of country, agency, and year fixed effects (Tables S1–S3); excluded influ-
ential country and agency outliers (Tables S4 and S5); re-coded the
dependent variable to take a value of 1 for any positive value of ODA and 0
otherwise and estimated a series of logistic regression models (Table S6);
included all the policy motives in a single regression equation (Table S7);
controlled for the occurrence of divided government (Table S8); controlled
for the occurrence of inter or intrastate armed conflict (Table S9); used a
more traditional dummy variable to measure independence (1 if an agency is
outside the Executive Office of the President or an executive department and
0 otherwise (Lewis and Selin 2012)) (Table S10); re-estimated our core mod-
els with an alternative continuous measure of agency independence by Selin
(forthcoming) (Table S11); considered alternative measures of need in recipi-
ent countries: the log of GDP per capita, percent of population living with less
than $5 a day, percent of population living with AIDS, and life expectancy
(Table S12); considered alternative measures of US economic and military
interest: log of the number of American troops stationed in the recipient
country, log of net foreign direct investment outflows from the US to the reci-
pient, and a binary indicator for the existence of a bilateral tax treaty between
the US and the recipient (Table S13); and accounted for uncertainty in the
estimation of our measure of agency independence by applying a nonpara-
metric bootstrap to the PCA model and using the method of composition
(Tanner 1991) to “propagate” the estimated uncertainty into our main regres-
sion models (Table S14). We were also hoping to treat seriously the potential
endogeneity between foreign aid and trade flows, but were unable to find an
instrumental variable which meets the exclusion restriction requirement. For
lack of better options, we lagged all the regressors by a year and re-estimated
all our main models (Table S15). Again, the main results remain substantively
unchanged.
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the time dimension does not affect our results in a mean-
ingful way. For example, an increase of one in Alliance is
associated with an increase of 1.081 in Log (ODA) when
Independence equals zero, but with a reduction of 0.588
when Independence equals one (the latter is statistically
indistinguishable from zero). Likewise, the interaction
term in the Trade OLS specification is negative, while
the Infant Mortality interaction is positive and statistically
significant.
A second potential concern is that outliers may drive
our results. Certain high leverage countries, for example,
Afghanistan and Egypt, receive large amounts of foreign
aid and are strategically important for the US president.
Similarly, a few of the aid-giving agencies may hold dis-
proportionate weight in our analysis, either because they
account for a large share of total ODA (for example,
USAID), or because they combine a high degree of inde-
pendence with a narrow regional focus (for example, the
African Development Foundation).
A natural way to guard against this potential outlier
problem is to re-estimate models while excluding prob-
lematic observations. In the online appendix (Tables S4
and S5), we show that the exclusion of extreme countries
and agencies does not affect our substantive conclusions.
A less ad hoc approach is to use a high breakdown point
M-estimator. The three right-most columns of Table 4
show the results we obtained using the lmRob procedure
(Wang, Zamar, Marazzi, Yohai, Salibian-Barrera, Maronna,
Zivot, Rocke, Martin, Maechler, and Konis 2013) to
re-estimate our cross-sectional models. Again, the results
are broadly consistent with our expectations.
Conclusion
We find that the institutional setup of the US bureau-
cracy matters a great deal for the distribution of foreign
aid. Our argument highlights the role of domestic institu-
tions, and thus challenges the assumption that the Execu-
tive can target aid wherever she sees fit. We point out
that a host of government agencies actually disburse aid.
These agencies can hamstring the Executive, making her
foreign policy goals difficult to achieve. We study the
success of the Executive in overcoming this managerial
problem in the context of one case: American foreign
aid-giving. Using a newly created continuous measure of
independence for US aid agencies, we show that when
agencies are dependent on the Executive, ODA flows clo-
sely connect to the diplomatic goals of the president.
Where agencies enjoy independence, or insulation from
Executive pressure, ODA flows better match development
ends than the administration’s foreign policy motives.
In sum, agency independence effectively inhibits the
president from directing foreign aid toward diplomatic
priorities.
These results suggest that the pool of resources avail-
able for Executive diplomacy may differ in systematic
TABLE 4. Cross-Sectional Relationship Between Foreign Policy Motives, Agency Independence, and ODA Allocation Patterns. Ordinary Least
Squares and Robust M-Estimator Regressions
OLS 1 OLS 2 OLS 3 M 1 M 2 M 3
(Intercept) 4.257 (1.192) 6.630 (1.223) 6.109 (1.271) 0.084 (0.269) 0.553 (0.292) 0.329 (0.303)
Polity 0.064 (0.019) 0.095 (0.017) 0.116 (0.017) 0.008 (0.004) 0.011 (0.004) 0.015 (0.004)
Log (Population) 0.470 (0.074) 0.617 (0.080) 0.425 (0.074) 0.036 (0.017) 0.045 (0.019) 0.027 (0.017)
Independence 0.206 (0.423) 3.794 (1.147) 2.867 (1.238) 0.381 (0.096) 0.587 (0.254) 0.539 (0.316)
Alliance 1.081 (0.453) 0.330 (0.106)
Alliance 9 Independence 1.669 (0.970) 0.575 (0.198)
Log (Trade) 0.031 (0.075) 0.057 (0.019)
Log (Trade) 9 Independence 0.601 (0.162) 0.159 (0.036)
Log (Infant Mortality) 0.789 (0.171) 0.130 (0.046)
Log (Infant
Mortality) 9 Independence
0.778 (0.371) 0.021 (0.092)
R2 0.034 0.043 0.062 0.006 0.007 0.008
Num. obs. 1828 1828 1828 1828 1828 1828


































FIG 2. Marginal Effects of Policy Motives on ODA Allocation.
(Note. Dotted lines represent 95% confidence bands. Rug plots indicate the location of each aid-giving agency on the independence scale.)
552 The Limits of Foreign Aid Diplomacy
fashion from the aggregate ODA figures that scholars
generally focus on. In particular, inferences drawn from
aggregate data could both overestimate the responsiveness
of independent agencies to diplomatic motives, and
underestimate their responsiveness to development need.
Our findings suggest a more nuanced interpretation of
domestic political institutions on the donor side. They
complement an emerging strand of research on the types
and channels of aid-giving (Fariss 2010; Winters 2010;
Raschky and Schwindt 2012; Dietrich 2013).
The lessons of our study can also inform the under-
standing of aid politics outside the United States. All
major donor countries use multiple government agencies
to distribute foreign aid (see Table 5). This suggests an
immediate path forward for future research: extending
our analysis cross-nationally. This would address whether
the independence of government aid-giving agencies var-
ies systematically across countries, providing new ground
for empirical tests of our expectations. In addition, a
cross-national study should explore how other features of
the political system, such as the rule of law or the
number of veto players, affect an agency’s de facto degree
of independence.
Our research also contributes to our understanding of
bureaucratic politics by addressing the extent to which
agency independence acts as a firewall against presiden-
tial influence. While we do not provide a general answer
to the question of whether de jure agency independence
translates into de facto independence, our evidence shows
an attenuation of executive influence in one particular
domain: foreign aid.
This study highlights the importance of agency-level
characteristics in influencing foreign aid distribution.
Future work should consider the design of the bureaucracy
and employ disaggregated data to explore how other
agency features shape foreign policy outcomes. For
instance, while we focus here on agency independence,
bureaucratic expertise can also foster agency autonomy
(Gailmard and Patty 2013) and may enable agencies to
take positions that diverge from the Executive. Given the
range and variety of agencies involved in implementing for-
eign policy, research that explores the role of bureaucratic
administration constitutes an agenda in its own right.
While this paper focuses on aid-giving in the US con-
text, our findings can also shed light on a much broader
set of topics in the study of foreign policy. For example,
the Federal Reserve and the Department of Treasury—
two agencies characterized by very different levels of
structural independence from the Executive—both hold
policy levers that can have tremendous effects on the US
position in the international capital markets. Immigration
policy represents another complex case for the Executive,
as its implementation relies on numerous agencies at the
federal level—including the Department of Homeland
Security, the Department of Justice, the Department of
Labor, and the Department of State—as well as the fed-
eral judiciary and a dizzying assortment of state and local
law enforcement agencies. Considering the bureaucratic
design of the many agencies involved in these foreign
policy areas may help explain why different actors per-
ceive—and respond to—a single country’s foreign policy
position in different ways.
TABLE 5. Number of Aid-Giving Agencies and ODA Commitments in
the 15 Largest Donor Nations (2012)
Donor ODA (Billion USD) Agency count
United States 30.69 15














(Note. Sources: OECD (2014a,b); Tierney et al. (2011).)
TABLE A1. Agency Independence Estimates for 89 U.S. Government
Agencies. Aid-giving Agencies in Bold
Agency Independence
Appalachian Regional Commission 0.55
Barry Goldwater Scholarship and Excellence
in Education Program
0.71
Board of Veterans’ Appeals 0.88
Broadcasting Board of Governors 0.75
Central Intelligence Agency 0.57
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board 1.01
Commodity Futures Trading Commission 0.66
Consumer Product Safety Commission 0.92
Corporation for National and Community Service 0.78
Council of Economic Advisers 0.49
Council on Environmental Quality 0.49
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 0.79
Department of Agriculture 0.24
Department of Commerce 0.23
Department of Defense 0.21




Department of Energy 0.27
Department of Health and Human Services 0.26
Department of Homeland Security 0.24
Department of Housing and Urban Development 0.29
Department of the Interior 0.30
Department of Justice 0.05
Department of Labor 0.26
Department of State 0
Department of Transportation 0.29
Department of the Treasury 0.27
Department of Veterans Affairs 0.35
Environmental Protection Agency 0.44
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 0.70
Export-Import Bank of the United States 0.68
Farm Credit Administration 0.74
Federal Communications Commission 0.65
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 0.75
Federal Election Commission 0.79
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 0.73
Federal Housing Finance Agency 0.83
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TABLE A1. (continued)
Agency Independence
Federal Labor Relations Authority 0.83
Federal Maritime Commission 0.88
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service 0.57
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission 0.97
Federal Reserve Board 1
Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board 0.79
Federal Trade Commission 0.86
General Services Administration 0.45
Harry S. Truman Scholarship Foundation 0.80
Institute for Museum and Library Services 0.78
Inter-American Foundation 0.80
James Madison Memorial Fellowship Foundation 0.80
Merit Systems Protection Board 0.97
Millennium Challenge Corporation 0.77
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 0.45
National Council on Disability 0.78
National Credit Union Administration 0.59
National Endowment for the Arts 0.68
National Endowment for the Humanities 0.62
National Labor Relations Board 0.91
National Mediation Board 0.88
National Science Foundation 0.78
National Security Education Board 0.75
National Security Staff 0.43
National Transportation Safety Board 0.95
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 0.91
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission 0.96
TABLE A1. (continued)
Agency Independence
Office of Government Ethics 0.68
Office of Management and Budget 0.34
Office of National Drug Control Policy 0.30
Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation 0.70
Office of Personnel Management 0.59
Office of Science and Technology 0.37
Office of Special Counsel 0.90
Office of the Federal Coordinator for Alaska Natural
Gas Transportation Projects
0.70
Office of the United States Trade Representative 0.33
Overseas Private Investment Corporation 0.69
Peace Corps 0.57
Postal Regulatory Commission 1.01
Railroad Retirement Board 0.79
Securities and Exchange Commission 0.70
Selective Service System 0.53
Small Business Administration 0.53
Social Security Administration 0.74
Surface Transportation Board 1.01
Tennessee Valley Authority 0.79
United States African Development Foundation 0.77
United States Agency for International Development 0.55
United States Election Assistance Commission 0.79
United States Institute of Peace 1
United States International Trade Commission 0.68
United States Postal Service 1
United States Trade and Development Agency 0.52
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